FOREWORD
Law of the Sea Negotiations 1971-1972-from Internationalism to Nationalism

H. GARY KNIGHT*

If there exists a dominant theme which can be said to characterize the period between publication of the 1971 "Law of the
Seas" issue of the San Diego Law Review and this current issue,
it must be the dramatic trend away from international solutions
to problems of ocean resource development and conservation and
toward nationalistic solutions. This trend is evident in three major
areas of the current law of the sea ("LOS") negotiations-the seabed question (i.e., the question of the legal-economic regime to
govern exploitation of non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction), fisheries management, and pollution control.
This issue contains timely and relevant articles on each of these
important subjects-three articles relating to the seabed question,
two on fisheries management problems, and one on pollution. In
addition to the student contributions in the synopsis of recent
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developments in the law of the seas, student comments are also
directed to three significant aspects of law of the sea issues, viz.,
the interests of land-locked states, the question of baselines for
outlying archipelagoes, and marine archaeology.
(1) THE SEABED QUESTION. Since publication of the last
issue of the San Diego Law Review devoted to the oceans, the
United States Seabed Committee has met twice (July-August, 1971,
and March, 1972), and the General Assembly has acted to expand
the membership of that Committee from 86 to 91 members, most
significantly adding the People's Republic of China, a factor which
has as yet undisclosed ramifications. More "seabed regime" proposals have been submitted (see generally, "Recent Developments
in the Law of the Seas III: A Synopsis," (Sovereignty-Seabed)
pp. 665).
As noted above, this issue contains three articles dealing with
varying aspects of the seabed question.
In "The Council of an International Sea-Bed Authority" (p. 404),
Professor Louis Sohn discusses the problems involved in structuring the decision making organ of an international oceans organization so that (1) it will be politically acceptable to all interests
and yet (2) it will be operatively functional. If a nationalistic
solution to the seabed question is avoided and a meaningful international regime adopted, this may well be the single most important feature of the international machinery, for the decisions
made by the "Council" will be the basis for all seabed operations.
Professor Sohn goes beyond the proposal he originally prepared
for the United States' draft seabed treaty and proposes in his article suggestions for a still more representative Council, indicating
a number of alternative patterns. This work is thus a valuable
contribution to those who must identify the issues, consider the
alternatives, and negotiate the regime to be adopted at the Third
Conference.
In "The Concept of 'Common Heritage of Mankind': A Political,
Moral or Legal Innovation?" (p. 390) Stephen Gorove indicates
some of the difficulties inherent in a much used term in the current LOS negotiations. Although most have tentatively concluded
that "common heritage of mankind" as applied to ocean resources
implies at least (1) non-appropriation of the area by nations or
persons, (2) international machinery to govern activities conducted in the area, and (3) some form of assistance to developing
countries from such activities, events occurring within the past
year would seem to indicate that the desirable elements in this
concept may not be a significant part (if any part at all) of the
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new oceans regime likely to emerge from the 1973 Conference.
Much support is now evident for an "economic resource zone" in
which the coastal state (though acceeding to a 12 mile limit for
the breadth of the territorial sea) would possess exclusive or preferential rights to all living and non-living resources of the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters out to a maximum of 200
miles from the baseline. Should this regime come about for adjacent areas, it is likely that the regime discussed by Francis Auburn
in "The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill" (p. 491) would
be adopted for the area beyond 200 miles, thus creating either outright national jurisdiction (to 200 miles) or flag-nation jurisdiction
(beyond 200 miles) for the entire ocean. The Bill discussed by
Professor Auburn would permit deep seabed mining activities to
be carried out under national laws and envisions parallel legislation in nations with advanced seabed mining technology (hearings
on the Senate counterpart of the Bill will probably already have
been held by the time this issue is published). Obviously, "common
heritage of mankind" comes off rather badly in this scenario. As
Professor Auburn notes in concluding his article, "for the vast
majority of states who do not have the technological capabilities
or capital to take part in mining, [the bill] offers no benefits from
the area which the General Assembly holds to be the common
heritage of mankind."
This nationalistic tendency is probably due to two factors, though
it is difficult to tell which is dominant or, indeed, which may have
precipitated the other. The first is the ascendant nationalism of
the developing countries. Some tentative support from developing nations for an international or "common heritage" approach
in the oceans was indicated shortly after Dr. Pardo's initiative
in the 1967 General Assembly where prognostications of great
wealth to be shared by developing countries were made. As
studies indicated a reduced magnitude of benefits to be garnered
from the development of ocean resources, the nationalistic element
began to emerge, and the developing nations are today in the forefront of the drive for a 200 mile "economic resource zone."
The second factor is the position of the United States' Department of Defense ("DOD"). DOD seeks maximum mobility in
the oceans through its proposals to limit the breadth of the territorial sea to 12 miles and revise the notion of "innocent passage"

to provide for "free transit" through, under, and over international straights. Articles I and II, submitted by the United States
delegation to the July-August, 1971, meeting of the U. N. Seabed
Committee contain these proposals. Several "straits states," particularly archipelago nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines, have adopted systems of straight baselines which
would effectively bar or limit passage through their many straits.
This important facet of the DOD position is discussed in a student
comment by Michael A. Leversen, "The Problems of Delimitations
of Base Lines for Outlying Archipelagos."
In order to secure its passage or transit objectives, DOD is probably willing to grant to developing nations (who, it must be
remembered, have the preponderant voting power at the 1973
Conference) essentially whatever they desire, so long as it does not
conflict with DOD's perceived needs of naval mobility. At first,
of course, and as noted above, it was supposed the LDC's desired
an international regime, and this was offered in the form of the
United States' Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area. Now, however, it appears that DOD
(through the United States delegation) may offer acceptance of
the 200 mile "economic resource zone" concept as the appropriate
quid pro quo for the straights passage proposal.
The role of the land-locked states in the nationalist-internationalist posturing featured in the current LOS debates is also of
some importance. In a student comment, "The Interests of LandLocked States in Law of the Seas," Patrick Childs identifies many
of the interests of land-locked states and their position in the international law of the sea negotiations. One interesting possibility
is that these states, whom one would suppose to support an international regime for extraction of living and non-living ocean resources beyond relatively narrow national limits, may in fact opt
for their coastal neighbors' point of view on broad economic resource zones in return for long sought after transit privileges.
(2) FISHERIES MANAGEMENT.
The fishing problem, because of the complex legal-political-biological-economic-social
factors involved, is generally conceded to be the real "chess game"
of the current LOS negotiations. Thomas A. Clingan, in "A Second
Look at United States Fisheries Management" (p. 432) suggests
that we "try something new" in our domestic fisheries policy and
advances an imaginative proposal which contemplates the entire
range of fishery management and allocation problems, from the
need for international action down to activities at the state and
local level. In an equally farsighted and imaginative article,
"Bridging the Gap to International Fisheries Agreement: A Guide
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for Unilateral Action," (p. 454) Jon L. Jacobson points out that,
similar to the "creeping nationalism" inherent in the seabed question, national assertions of jurisdiction over ocean space for fisheries
purposes "contributes to the creeping disintegration of an important area of the earth's surface that might otherwise, if given
time, be set aside as the 'common heritage of mankind.'" Professor Jacobson, whose work, like that of Professor Clingan, is
partially supported by the National Sea Grant Program, offers a
proposal for characterizing the inevitable national action in this
area of ocean law so as not to prejudice the possibility for future
meaningful international cooperative efforts, a laudable objective
in light of current trends in the LOS negotiations.
There are several explicit goals in the United States proposals
for both a seabed regime and an international fisheries regime.
Among these are the protection of national security, the development of needed energy and food resources, the providing of assistance to developing countries, and the protection of the marine
environment. However, the goal of developing workable international institutions to govern activities in ocean space may be, in
the long run, the most important result of the current LOS effort.
If this is the case, much emphasis needs to be placed on the value
of such an international cooperative effort in terms of its effect
on future world government, either as a base from which to build
a new entity or as a model from which to draw revision ideas for
the United Nations. Thus, desires for rational biological, economic,
or social solutions to the fisheries maze should perhaps not be
allowed to totally eliminate the international community's vital
interest in establishment of a viable system of international relations and cooperation. The contributions of Professors Clingan
and Jacobson contain proposals geared to these long range objectives.
(3) POLLUTION. In "Oil Pollution Problems Arising out of
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf: The Santa Barbara Disaster," David A. Walmsley takes the reader away from the high
rhetoric of militant environmentalists and militant industrialists
to the nuts and bolts problems of using the United States' legal
system to secure redress for damages resulting from oil pollution at
sea and to prohibit or regulate such activities in the future. In
observing that the Santa Barbara diaster "adequately demonstrates

the legal system's incapacity, or at least its clumsiness, in handling
catastrophic occurrences arising out of the exploitation of the
outer Continental Shelf," Walmsley makes some suggestions about
the proper role of law in environmental protection.
Obviously, this area is coming in for a good deal of attention at
the international level. Two issues seem to be of primary importance at the present. First is the understandable lack of enthusiasm
about environmental protection on the part of developing nations
who view pollution as basically a "good" economic indicator because it means development is occurring. Why, these nations ask,
should they retard development for the sake of "quality of life"
arguments by nations who have already achieved their technological
growth at the cost of no small amount of pollution? Convincing
the developing world that it is in their long run economic and technological interest to assist in curtailing destruction of the environment, and particularly the marine environment, is likely to be
a large task.
The second issue concerns what international body or agency
is going to do what to whom? The Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO) is concerned with marine
pollution originating from vessels, but because of its maritime industry orientation the organization has difficult problems of acceptance by the majority of developing states. The United Nations
Seabed Committee is primarily concerned in its pollution activities
with pollution originating from seabed and subsoil exploitation
efforts. Even if both succeed in adopting strong anti-pollution
regimes, it remains the fact that only about 10% of all ocean pollution comes from these two sources and that the remaining 90%
is from land based sources (i.e., air pollution fallout into the ocean,
and drainage of adjacent land areas). The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm) has a "total environment" perspective, but is likely to produce little more than a
resolution suggesting that the 27th General Assembly create an
international environmental protection organization.
The issue is where to place the emphasis and what objectives
should be given priority. Jacques Piccard pointed out the mind
boggling inclusivity of the problem at the Pacem In Maribus II
Convocation on Malta last summer when he observed, after hearing much discussion on problems of pollution of the Mediterranean,
that the problem of the Mediterranean could not be validly separated from the problem of pollution of the world ocean; that the
latter could not validly be separated from land and air pollution;
that the latter could not validly be separated from the rate of tech-
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nological advancement; and that the latter could not validly be
separated from the rate of population growth. Thus, ultimately,
the solution to ocean pollution must lie in a careful reexamination
of our entire conception about the role of man in the ecosystem and
particularly his numbers and his use of available resources. In the
interm, however, temporary palliatives must be sought, and the
efforts of such bodies as IMCO and the United Nations Seabed
Committee are to be supported. If our present legal system is
inadequate to cope with the problem, as Walmsley suggests, then
perhaps we ought to be more vigorous about revising it.
(4) NON-EXTRACTIVE USES OF THE SEABED. An increasingly important aspect of ocean space use is the plethora of proposals for non-extractive use of the seabed and water column.
These concepts include floating cities, giant port facilities, underwater parks and aquatic preserver, undersea resort facilities,
floating airports-the list is limited only by one's imagination.
Among these interests is that of marine archaeology, discussed in
a student comment by Howard H. Shore, "Marine Archaeology and
International Law: Background and Some Suggestions" (p. 668).
The issue of non-extractive uses has been raised before the United
Nations Seabed Committee by Belgium in connection with a proposal for a "superport" to be located some 27 kilometers off the
Belgian coast, on its continental shelf. Serious jurisdictional
questions have been raised in connection with the proposal, and it
is clear that one desirable outcome (upon which there would probably be substantial agreement) of the 1973 Conference would be
an extension of the continental shelf doctrine to include, as within
the exclusive purview of the coastal state, non-extractive uses of
the seabed. Clearly, such an agreement would well contemplate
the marine archaeological issue as well.
CONCLUSION. Whoever writes the forward for the 1973 "Law
of the Seas" issue of the San Diego Law Review, let us hope that
he will be able to report a turning back to basically international
solutions to ocean resource problems. Viewing that as unlikely,
however, I believe that the contributions contained in this issue
may offer some of the most creative concepts yet in an effort to
take "creeping nationalism" in stride and so handle it at the current LOS negotiations and in the 1973 Conference as not to forever prejudice the possibility of a meaningful international oceans
regime.

